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IPO anomalies in the corporate debt markets are to great extent unexplored 
field in the academic literature. The aim of this paper is to investigate the 
underpricing phenomenon of newly issued corporate bonds on the Catalyst 
market and its determinants. I use event study methodology to test for 
underpricing and perform regressions to find its determinants. The sample 
includes 142 corporate bonds issued between March 2010 and August 2013 
and listed on the Catalyst market. The computations confirm the uderpricing 
effect in the CEE market, however do not allow to indicate its determinants. 
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IPO anomalies on the stock market are extensively documented in the literature. Researchers all 
over the world investigated both short term mispricing and long term underperformance phenomena. 
Papers offer plenty of hypotheses explain these patterns and their origins. Taking that into account it 
may seem astonishing, that very few studies concern similar phenomena in the bond market1. Up to 
now, there are several papers including observations from the United States and foreign markets, mostly 
Japan. What is more, it seems that no paper investigated bond IPOs in the markets of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate, whether the initial underpricing of the bond IPOs could be 
observed in the e market and to find out which factors contribute to the underpricing. The study is 
composed of 3 parts. The reminder of the article is organised as follows. First, I review the existing 
literature in the field, focusing both on theoretical explanations and empirical research. Second, I present 
datasets and research methods employed. Finally, I present the empirical research and its results. My 
computations are based on a preselected sample of 142 corporate bonds issued between March 2010 and 
                                                             
1 Interesting reviews could be found in studies of Ritter (1998) or Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001). 
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August 2013 which were listed Catalyst, the only regulated market in CEE dedicated to corporate debt. 
The paper ends with conclusion and suggestions for further research. 
 
The paper makes two crucial contributions to the relatively modest literature on initial bond offering 
(IBO) mispricing. Firstly, it attempts to verify whether the IBO mispricing is present also in the CEE 
markets. Secondly, it tries to identify which factors influence a size of the mispricing, by amplifying it 
or minimising. The results of analysis are important for both “sides” of financial markets. From the point 
of companies seeking financing, they allows to better estimate a cost of capital and its components, and 
thus helps to decrease and optimise it. On the other hand, the research results helps investors to better 
forecast the expected rate of returns in the corporate bond market. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BASIS 
There are many hypotheses explaining initial underpricing at stock IPOs, but not many of them 
could be applied to the bond market. In practice, two standard explanations are offered: asymmetric 
information between investors and excessive competition between underwriters.  
The first prominent explanation is presence of asymmetry in access to information among various 
market participants. The hypotheses may come in a few forms which may slightly differ from each other. 
Rock (1986) emphasise the winner’s curse problem, which emerges when well informed investors 
request allocation only of low and fair value IPOs. Thus, the allocation of overpriced and frequently 
unprofitable IPOs is left to uninformed investors. The problem is solved through underpicing. It offers 
profit to uninformed investors, which would otherwise not participate in the IPOs. The Rock’s model is 
extended by Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm (2002), and also by Sherman and Titman (2002). Those 
authors regard undepricing as a sort of payment to IPO participants for revealing information about their 
opinions and valuations of the bonds offered. 
Another extension of information-based theories focuses on differences in access to information of 
investors and managers. This hypothesis involves signalling models (Allen and Faulhaber 1989, Welch 
1989, Grinblatt and Hwang 1989) and is related to a lemons problem. If investors cannot tell the 
difference between “good” and “bad” companies, they value all of them the same. This is the reason 
why managers of good companies want to differentiate themselves from the bad ones and take advantage 
of underpricing mechanism “to receive their true, high worth” (Cai, Helwege, Warga 2007). Some 
authors suggest that the underpricing problem may be reduced thanks to a good reputation of an 
underwriter (Chemmanur and Paeglis 2005, Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994, Hughes and Thakor 1992, 
Diamond 1989, Diamond 1991, Gorton 1996, Fenn 2000, Carty 1996). 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1997) suggest that undepricing could be also a result of excessive 
competition among underwriters. According to their explanation, underwrites compete rather for high 
credit quality issues than low quality ones (junk bonds or not rated bonds). As a consequence, they drive 
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up prices of investment grade bonds and push down prices of junk bonds. Due to that, the first group 
may be overpriced, and the other underpriced. 
The competition hypothesis appears to have two weak points. Firstly, it is difficult to justify why 
some investors actually buy overpriced bonds. Secondly, there is an issue of other dimensions over 
which underwrites compete: commissions, size of an issue, etc. 
The competition hypothesis seems to be confirmed for instance by Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel 
(1997), who observed that positive abnormal rates of return on the IPO day are characteristic for low 
rating bonds, while investment grade debt often perform poorly during IPO. These studies appear to be 
confirmed by Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007), but it is worth noting that McKenzie and Takaoka (2008) 
come to an opposite conclusion. Some extensions of the competition model may be found also in the 
paper of Takaoka and McKenzie (2006). 
Besides the theories described above, some attempts were taken to explain the underpricing 
phenomenon with liquidity issues. However, this field of research resulted in mixed conclusions. Ellul 
and Pagano (2006) think that bond underpricing may be regarded as a form of compensation for low 
liquidity right after the IPOs, which they partly confirm with their empirical research. On the other hand, 
Booth and Chua (1996) conclude, that initial underpricing induce higher investors’ activity right after 
the bond IPOs. Finally, the study of McKenzie and Takaoka (2008) is also worth mentioning. The 
authors connect the IPO underpricing effect with a level of market and interest rates volatility. 
Empirical research over abnormal IBO returns takes usually two forms: either analysis of bond 
YTMs or price patterns. Early studies (Ederington 1974, Lindvall 1977, Sorensen 1982) examined 
mostly YTMs and indicated that these of newly issued bonds before the first listing are usually higher 
than already listed bonds with a matching maturity and credit quality. However, because of difficulties 
in proper YTM  calculation in case of bonds with built-in options, Weinstein (1978) decided to use 
benchmark-corrected prices instead of YTMs. He based his computations on a sample of 179 initial 
bond offerings and 412 seasoned bond offerings from years 1962-74. Most of the bonds were investment 
grade. Weinstein observed 0,366% average abnormal return in the first month of listing. On the other 
hand, Fung and Rudd (1986) did not manage to confirm existence of IBO underpricing and 
Wasserfallena and Wydler (1988) found proofs of this phenomena in the Swiss market. 
Older studies did not distinguish between initial and secondary bond offerings. In contrast, Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1997) investigated exclusively IBOs. The authors used listings from NYSE 
and found positive abnormal returns averaging 1,85% for junk bonds and negative abnormal returns for 
investment grades. A similar methodology was employed by Helwege and Kleiman (1988), who used 
also dealer quotations. The regarded such approach as more appropriate due dealer-dominated character 
of the bond market. These researchers found statistically significant underpricing of speculative bonds, 
but only of 39 basis points. 
Among the newer IBO research, it is necessary to point out papers of Kozhanov and Ogden (2012), 
as well as Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007), which both generally confirm underpricing phenomenon. In 
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contrast, McKenzie and Takaoka (2008), find out that corporate bonds in the Japanese market were 
rather overpriced than underpriced. Finally, interesting remarks could be found in a paper of Kohanov, 
Ogden and Vaghefi (2011). These authors indicate, that corporate bonds usually right after the IPO 
deliver abnormal rates of return, which last up to 6 months. However, later the bonds usually 
underperform effectively erasing initial superior returns. 
 
3. DATA SOURCES AND RESEARCH METHODS 
I based my computations on all corporate bonds listed on the Catalyst market, which were issued 
between March 2010 and August 2013 (the full period since the market was opened). I eliminated from 
the sample zero-coupon bonds (because of different price behaviour), government guaranteed bonds 
(because there are more similar to government bonds than corporate bonds), and bonds with no single 
trade during the first 100 days from IPO (in order to eliminate the distortions implied by lack of 
liquidity). After these operations, the final sample consisted of 142 corporate bond offerings. Data 
involving prices, dates, and benchmarks come from Bloomberg. 
The analysis of behaviour of corporate bonds after an offering was performed according to a 
following procedure. First, I begin with the popular average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
approach. Next, using previously calculated ACARs, I performed regression analysis with dummy 
variables. 
I begin by calculating abnormal returns (ARs) for each day within the 180-days period after the 
first listing. The daily AR was calculated as: 
 
ARit = Rit − RE(i,t),        (1) 
 
where Rit denotes bond i return2 on day t, and  RE(i,t) is bond’s i expected return on day t. The 
econometric literature offers a wide range of expected return models, which additionally in recent years 
significantly gained on sophistication. Interesting reviews could be found for instance in Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay (1996), MacKinlay (1997) or Kothari and Warner (1997, 2006). In this paper I employ 
benchmark-corrected rates of return, which is similar to the methodologies employed in the studies of  
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, Patel  (1997) and Cai, Helwege, Warga (2007). From the formal point of view, it 
is a variation of a market model, as presented by MacKinlay (1996). 
 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit,         (2) 
E(εit0) = 0,        var(εit0) = σε2. 
 
                                                             
2 I used logarithmic rates of return in all the computations. 
PAGE 5| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2014, VOL. 1, Series. 1 
 
where Rit and Rmt are the period-t returns on security and the market portfolio, εit is the zero mean 
disturbance term and αi,  βi and σε2 are the parameters of the market model. The actual model I use was 
a market-adjusted return model (MacKinlay 1996). The market adjusted model is a restricted market 
model with αi constrained to be 0 and  βi constrained to be 1. 
Finally, the model's specifications is as follows: 
 
Rit = Rmt.      (3) 
 
I use maturity-matched Bloomberg/EFFAS Bond Price Indices as benchmark portfolios. It would 
be more appropriate to use a corporate bond index, which would factor not only variation in interest 
rates, but also changes in credit spreads, but there are no such indices available in the CEE market.  
It is also necessary to point out, that the first ARit was computed against the issuing price, and that 
it related to the benchmark behaviour in the period between the offering and the first transaction day.  
After computing daily ARs based on expected return models, I proceed with time-series 
aggregation, so as to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CARs): 
 
CARi = ∑ ARitTt=1 ,      (4) 
 
and then I average CARs cross-sectionally for all the bonds in the sample, in order to obtain average 
cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs): 
 
ACAR = ∑ CARiNi=1 .      (5) 
 
When I calculate ACARs, I divide the full sample additionally into subsamples, based on various 
bond characteristics, which could potentially influence the scale of abnormal returns: maturity, 
collateral, public status at the time of issue, its size and its character (initial or secondary). 
The zero hypothesis that ACARs are not significantly different from zero was confronted with an 
alternative hypothesis that ACARs actually differ from zero. I verified this hypothesis with parametric 
(t-statistic and t-Student distribution) and non-parametric tests (z-statistic from a bootstrap procedure). 
Next, using the CARs based on the closing price at the first session with any transactions, I regress 
CARs against some dummy variables. The aim of the regression was to investigate which factors 
contribute to the variation in abnormal returns and was based on the same variables, which were used 
earlier to divide the sample into the subsamples: 
• IPO – the first offering on the bond market, 
• private status – issuer’s stocks were not listed in any regulated market at the day of offering, 
• lack of collateral – bonds were not secured with any collateral, 
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• small issue – a total size of an issue did not exceed 10 mio. PLN, 
• long term bond – bond’s maturity was longer than 3 years. 
The regression analysis was performed in 8 separate dummy variable configurations. The 
regression parameters are estimated employing OLS and tested in parametric way. 
 
4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
Figure 1:. presents the cumulated ACAR rates during 180 days after the first transaction.  
 
 
Figure 1: ACARs during 180 days following the first trading session. 
 
The price behaviour generally follows the patterns observed in the US market in the subinvestment 
grade bonds segment. During the first 2 months of listings the bonds delivered almost 1% abnormal 
returns. Next, the superior performance successively weakened, and finally between the 4th and the 6th 
month the positive abnormal returns were erased to 0 or even became negative. Nonetheless, as it is 
depicted in Table 1., although the initial positive returns were statistically different from 0, the later 
negative ACARs lacked statistical significance. 
 
Table 1: ACARs among IBOs and SBOs. 
  Full sample IBOs SBOs 
Day no. ACAR (%) t-stat N ACAR (%) t-stat N ACAR (%) t-stat N 
1 0,619*** 3,783*** 142 0,432** 2,005** 24 0,656*** 3,414*** 118 
2 0,675*** 4,139*** 142 0,597*** 2,767*** 24 0,691*** 3,601*** 118 
3 0,696*** 4,198*** 142 0,561*** 2,588*** 24 0,723*** 3,707*** 118 
10 0,718*** 3,969*** 141 0,538 1,583 24 0,755*** 3,638*** 117 










Days after the first trading session
Full sample IBOs SBOs
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60 0,906*** 3,57*** 130 0,869* 1,907* 23 0,914*** 3,108*** 107 
90 0,351 1,531 118 0,551 1,250 23 0,303 1,138 95 
150 -0,432 -1,313 103 0,114 0,275 20 -0,563 -1,421 83 
180 -0,636 -1,461 98 0,071 0,159 19 -0,806 -1,522 79 
*, **, ***  denote statistical difference from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%  levels. “N” is the number of observations. 
 
What is interesting, the IBOs’ returns were not higher, but actually lower, than these of SBOs. It 
stays in vivid contrast to what is observed in developed markets. 
Table 2. depicts ACARs during the first trading session in the subsamples. 
 
Table 2: ACARs in the subsamples (own computations) 
 
ACAR (%) N % of the sample t-stat 
Panel 1: private/public status 
Private companies 0,308 54 38,03 1,075 
Public companies 0,809*** 88 61,97 4,117*** 
Panel 2: maturity 
Short-term bonds (up to 3 years) 0,677*** 92 64,79 4,725*** 
Long-term bonds (more than 3 years) 0,510 50 35,21 1,317 
Panel 3: size of an issue 
Small issues (up to 10 mio. PLN) 0,396** 64 45,07 2,055** 
Big issues (over 10 mio. PLN) 0,801*** 78 54,93 3,171*** 
Panel 4: collateral 
Lack of collateral 0,634*** 128 90,14 3,539*** 
Collateral 0,475 14 9,86 1,700 
Panel 5: IPO/SPO status 
Initial bond offerings 0,432** 24 16,90 2,005** 
Seasoned bond offerings 0,656*** 118 83,10 3,414*** 
*, **, ***  denote statistical difference from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%  levels. “N” is the number of observations. 
 
Analysing the Table 2., it is difficult to indicate which factors determine the size of underpricing. 
In fact, none of the factors, which were analysed in previous research, does not seem to contribute to 
forming the abnormal returns. These observations are confirmed by regression analysis shown in Table 
3. 
 
Table 3: Dummy variable regression (own computations). 
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept (%) 
0,656*** 0,806*** 0,475 0,801*** 0,677*** 0,831*** 0,652 0,787 
3,663*** 3,930*** 0,912 3,650*** 3,337*** 3,861*** 1,228 1,405 
IPO (%) 
-0,224         -0,174   -0,243 
-0,514         -0,399   -0,524 
Private company 
(%) 
  -0,501       -0,490   -0,359 
  -1,493       -1,452   -0,998 
    0,159       0,371 0,358 
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Lack of collateral 
(%)     0,291       0,654 0,626 
Small issue (%) 
      -0,405     -0,529 -0,431 
      -1,239     -1,524 -1,188 
Long-term bond 
(%) 
        -0,167   -0,368 -0,345 
        -0,489   -1,004 -0,883 
R^2 (%) 0,19 1,57 0,06 1,08 0,17 1,68 1,93 2,97 
Adjusted R^2 (%) -0,53 0,86 -0,65 0,38 -0,54 0,27 -0,20 -0,60 
*, **, ***  denote statistical difference from 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%  levels. 
 
Although the intercept in most cases is significantly different from 0, but it was not possible to 
extract the factors that determine the size of underpricing. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In comparison with stock IPOs, anomalies connected with bond issues are relatively weakly 
investigated in the economic literature. Few studies concentrated mostly on US market suggested 
underpricing phenomenon among newly issued corporate bonds. This paper was probably the first 
attempt to find out whether the similar phenomenon may be observed on the Catalyst, and to answer the 
question which factors contribute to its creation. 
The performed analysis allowed to confirm the existence of uderpricing of newly issued bonds in 
the CEE corporate bond market. However, it was not possible to indicate any specific factors which 
particularly impacted the size of underpricing. What is more, I was unable to confirm observations from 
the US market, that the abnormal returns are characteristic particularly for initial public offerings. On 
the Catlyst market in years 2010-13 the abnormal returns were generally similar, without regard for 
issue size, maturity, collateral, public or private status of an issuer, or the issue character: IBO or SBO. 
Further research should concentrate on a few areas. Firstly, the sample should be expanded in both 
the time dimension (emissions which took place after publication of this paper) and the geographic 
dimension (emerging markets other than CEE). Moreover, it would be highly valuable to expand the 
sample into OTC market, for instance based on dealer quotations. Secondly, it would be very useful to 
design some credit risk index for the CEE corporate bond markets. It would allow more precise 
estimations of the underpricing. Thirdly, it would be valuable to assess the impact of a credit quality on 
the size of the underpricing and the price patterns following offerings. Nonetheless, the main obstacle 
is that most bonds on the Catalyst are not rated. Finally, increasing the number of dummy variables (for 
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